SPECIALTY COURTS, EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE NEED TO REVISE THE TEXAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

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I. INTRODUCTION

As of January 2013 there were roughly “140 operational specialty courts in Texas.”¹ These specialty courts include an array of focuses, “such as adult and juvenile drug courts, veteran courts, DWI courts, … family drug courts,” and mental health courts.² A listing of Texas specialty courts that is maintained by the Texas Governor’s office includes the foregoing types of specialty courts, as well as reentry courts, “DWI hybrid” courts, co-occurring disorder courts, and prostitution courts.³ These courts differ from the usual adjudicatory model. For example, the first of “Ten Key Components” of drug courts is the following: “Drug courts integrate alcohol and other drug treatment services with justice system case processing.”⁴ Going beyond adjudication and punishment, the “mission of drug courts is to stop the abuse of alcohol and other drugs and related criminal activity.”⁵ Correspondingly, the following characteristics are typical of “the vast majority of mental health courts”:⁶

• A specialized court docket, which employs a problem-solving approach to court processing in lieu of more traditional court procedures for certain defendants with mental illnesses.

• Judicially supervised, community-based treatment plans for each defendant participating in the court, which a team of court staff and mental health professionals design and implement.

• Regular status hearings at which treatment plans and other conditions are periodically reviewed for appropriateness, incentives are offered to reward adherence to court conditions, and sanctions are imposed on participants who do not adhere to conditions of participation.

³ Id.
⁵ Id.
The judge’s role in a specialty court differs from that of the traditional judicial role. As a specialty court judge, “the judge’s role is less that of a traditional ‘umpire,’ than a problem-solver, who coordinates court proceedings with one or more parties and a range of service providers, including social workers, psychologists, drug, alcohol, employment, or family counselors, and others.” As one mental health court judge described, “Being a judge in a problem-solving court looks very different from what has been the judge’s traditional role. A judge in a problem-solving court becomes the leader of a team rather than a dispassionate arbitrator.” In that regard, “the collaborative nature of drug court decision making (seen most clearly in staffings) may undermine perceptions of judicial independence and impartiality.” In addition, because the judge – as team leader – will be coordinating information and discussion between multiple members of the specialty court team, “in such a capacity, ex parte communications with these various participants can be difficult to avoid.” Correspondingly, “a blanket prohibition on ex parte communication” could thwart the specialty court judge’s efforts at addressing “underlying causes of legal problems giving rise to the cases they adjudicate” such as substance abuse or mental illness. In addition, exposure to ex parte communications and extensive involvement in staffings can lead to concerns regarding a specialty court judge’s impartiality in any subsequent judicial proceedings – particularly in situations in which an individual has been terminated from the specialty court program.

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8 See CHARLES G. GYEH, JAMES J. ALFINI, STEVEN LUBET, AND JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 5.03(7), 5-23 (5th ed. 2013).


11 GEYH ET AL., supra note 8, at § 5.03(7), 5-23 (italics in original). At specialty court team staffings, “the judge in the problem-solving court now hears all kinds of information that a judge would not normally hear, nor would the information necessarily be considered relevant to the determination of the facts or law of the case at hand.” Arkfeld, supra note 9, at 317.

12 GEYH ET AL., supra note 8, at § 5.03(7), 5-23 (italics in original).

13 See William G. Meyer, supra note 10, at 205-06 (discussing possible disqualification issues, and observing that a “judge should disclose on the record information that he or she believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if he or she believes that there is no real basis for disqualification”).
The Texas Code of Judicial Conduct\textsuperscript{14} does not include any provisions that recognize the new role of judges in specialty courts. This Article will discuss the shortcomings in this regard in the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly with regard to ex parte communications; the approach set forth in the American Bar Association’s 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct;\textsuperscript{15} and the law in several other states. Finally, the Article will propose revisions to the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct pertaining to ex parte communications and specialty courts, and the related topic of disqualifications or recusals.\textsuperscript{16}

II. SPECIALTY COURTS AND CURRENT SHORTCOMINGS IN THE TEXAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

The Texas Code of Judicial Conduct does not mention specialty courts.\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, although a January 2005 report of the Texas Supreme Court’s Task Force on the Code of Judicial Conduct included recommendations for several amendments to the Texas Code, that report also did not address specialty courts.\textsuperscript{18} Accordingly, the current Texas Code presumptively governs judges in both traditional courts, as well as specialty courts. There are several sections relevant to ex parte communications and disqualifications or recusals. First, Canon 3(B)(8) places significant limits on the judge’s consideration of ex parte communications.\textsuperscript{19} Although the current Canon includes an exception for ex parte communications that are “expressly authorized by law,”\textsuperscript{20} the Texas Code, however, does not further define the phrase “authorized by law.” Does it extend to local rules establishing specialty courts, or is it limited to statutes, formally adopted administrative regulations, and court opinions? As will be discussed below, in contrast to the Texas Code, the 2007 ABA Model Code provides further


\textsuperscript{15} ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2011 ed.), available at \url{http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_code_of_judicial_conduct.html}.

\textsuperscript{16} There are other ethical issues that can arise with regard to specialty courts that are beyond the scope of this Article. For an excellent overview discussion of ethical issues in drug courts that would be pertinent to any specialty court, see Meyer, \textit{supra} note 10. \textit{See also} GEYH ET AL., \textit{supra} note 8, at § 10.05(3), 10-27 (highlighting situations in which specialty court judges had “associated with criminal defendants outside of court in ways that appear improper”).

\textsuperscript{17} See generally TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, \textit{supra} note 14.


\textsuperscript{19} TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(8), \textit{supra} note 14.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Id.} Canon 3(B)(8)(e).
guidance in this regard with respect to specialty courts.21 Similar changes are warranted for the Texas Code.

Another issue concerning specialty courts that should be considered and addressed pertains to disqualifications or recusals. Canon 3 of the Texas Code requires a judge to perform the duties of office “impartially and diligently.”22 Specifically, subsection (B)(1) of Canon 3 requires that a judge not decide a matter “in which disqualification or recusal is appropriate.”23 In addition, a “judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice,” and a “judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice ….”24 A specialty court judge may learn a considerable amount of information about a program participant both on the record and through ex parte communications as the specialty court’s team leader. In addition, due to “the intense level of involvement a problem-solving judge has with the defendant and the case, there has always been a question about the judge’s impartiality.”25 As will be discussed below, some states have adopted particular provisions relating to disqualifications or recusals in specialty court proceedings.26 Should the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct be amended to include any specific rule in this regard for specialty courts?

III. THE ABA MODEL APPROACH

The American Bar Association (ABA) substantially revised its Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 2007.27 For the first time, the Model Code included recognition of specialty courts.28 In particular, the revised Code addressed specialty courts in Comment 3 to Section 1 of the Application provisions of the Code, which provides:

In recent years many jurisdictions have created what are often called “problem solving” courts, in which judges are authorized by court rules to act in nontraditional ways. For example, judges presiding in drug courts and monitoring the progress of participants in those courts’ programs may be authorized and even encouraged to communicate directly with social workers, probation officers, and others outside the context of their usual judicial role

21 See infra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
22 TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3, supra note 14.
23 Id. Canon 3(B)(1).
24 Id. Canon 3(B)(5)-(6). See also TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(b)(1-3) (identifying certain grounds for recusal in civil cases including questionable impartiality, “personal bias or prejudice,” and “personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts”)
25 See Arkfeld, supra note 9, at 319.
26 See infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
27 CHARLES G. GEYH ET AL., supra note 8, at § 1.03, 1-5. There were also further amendments in 2010. See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 15.
28 One specialty court judge observed that the 2007 “Code for the first time recognizes those of us who work in problem-solving courts.” See Arkfeld, supra note 9, at 318.
as independent decision makers on issues of fact and law. When local rules specifically authorize conduct not otherwise permitted under these Rules, they take precedence over the provisions set forth in the Code. Nevertheless, judges serving on “problem solving” courts shall comply with this Code except to the extent local rules provide and permit otherwise.29

In the lead-up to the adoption of the 2007 ABA Model Code, several witnesses at hearings conducted by the ABA’s Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct “urged the Commission to create special ethical rules” for specialty courts.30 Because of the number and wide variety of specialty courts, however, the Commission opted not to adopt separate ethical guidelines solely for specialty courts.31 Instead, the Commission set forth Comment 3 as quoted above, by which the ABA recognized that judges presiding over specialty courts are engaging in “nontraditional” activities as part of their duties.32 The Comment also reflects the Commission’s intent that local rules governing specialty courts should prevail over the Code’s provisions when they “specifically authorize conduct not otherwise permitted under these Rules.”33 Accordingly, in those states that have adopted the 2007 Model Code, judges in specialty courts who face ethical questions will need to review their state’s version of the Code, but may also consult local rules that govern the specialty court.34

The 2007 ABA Model Code also addressed and acknowledged that the judge’s role in a specialty court is different from that of a court in a traditional proceeding in the coverage of issues pertaining to ex parte communications. First,
Model Rule 2.9(A)(5) provides that “[a] judge may initiate, permit, or consider any ex parte communication when expressly authorized by law to do so.” In turn, the 2007 Model Code defines “law” to include “court rules as well as statutes, constitutional provisions, and decisional law.” The drafters of the 2007 ABA Model Code provided further guidance with regard to this subsection by including Comment 4 that specifically discussed ex parte communications in specialty courts:

A judge may initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications expressly authorized by law, such as when serving on therapeutic or problem-solving courts, mental health courts, or drug courts. In this capacity, judges may assume a more interactive role with parties, treatment providers, probation officers, social workers, and others.

This provision and comment go further than previous ethical guidelines in attempting to address specialty courts. Nonetheless, “the Commission stopped short of recommending an express problem-solving justice exception to the bar on ex parte communications” due to the wide variety and types of specialty courts. Accordingly, some commentators have suggested that states or local jurisdictions do more to tailor statutes or court rules to address the unique needs of specialty courts in their jurisdictions.

IV. A REVIEW FROM OTHER STATES

Although there is not yet a considerable amount of case authority regarding ex parte communications and disqualification or recusal issues arising from specialty court proceedings, several other states have considered these issues in both judicial decisions and ethics opinions. In addition, about half the states have adopted the 2007 ABA Model Code and its provisions recognizing specialty courts. This Section will examine the existing case law and ethics opinions from other states, and then turn to a review of those states that have not only adopted
that 2007 ABA Model Code, but also included additional, unique provisions relating to specialty courts.

A. Case Law and Ethics Opinions

A judge overseeing a specialty court will often be exposed to a significant amount of information about a program participant not only through traditional judicial processes, but also via program staffings or ex parte communications with court team members.\(^{41}\) What, then, is the judge’s proper action in a situation in which a hearing is necessary, for example, to consider whether an individual’s specialty court participation should be terminated or in subsequent proceedings on issues such as parole revocation or sentencing? Case authority, as well as ethics opinions, from other jurisdictions with regard to these questions vis-à-vis specialty court judges provide mixed outcomes. This Section will explore relevant recent judicial decisions and ethics opinions from several other states.

1. New Hampshire

In the New Hampshire case of *State v. Belyea*,\(^{42}\) the defendant had pleaded guilty to forgery and credit card offenses and, following certain probation violations, received a suspended sentence, but with the condition that he take part in a drug court program.\(^{43}\) During his time with the program, he garnered three program sanctions, the last of which resulted from his leaving the state without permission for two months.\(^{44}\) Thereafter, the state moved to impose the previously suspended sentence and to terminate the defendant from the drug court program.\(^{45}\) In response to the state’s motion, the defendant moved to recuse the judge “from presiding over any termination proceedings, contending that the judge’s participation as a member of the drug court team, which had recommended his termination, created an appearance of impropriety.”\(^{46}\) The trial judge denied the motion and presided over the termination hearing.\(^ {47}\) At the close of the hearing, the judge “ruled that the defendant’s participation in the Program [sic] was ‘no longer warranted,’ and he imposed the … suspended sentence.”\(^ {48}\) On appeal, the defendant urged that the judge should have recused himself and contended “that a disinterested observer would entertain significant doubt about whether … [the trial judge] prejudged the facts and was able to remain indifferent to the outcome.

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\(^{41}\) See Meyer, *supra* note 10, at 205 (observing that a judge overseeing a specialty court will “often have substantial information about … [specialty] court participants – some of which was gained through on-the-record colloquies and pleadings and other information from informal staffings …”) (focusing on drug courts).

\(^{42}\) 999 A.2d 1080 (N.H. 2010).

\(^{43}\) *Id.* at 1081.

\(^{44}\) *Id.* at 1082.

\(^{45}\) *Id.*

\(^{46}\) *Id.*

\(^{47}\) *Id.*

\(^{48}\) *Id.* The defendant had admitted during the hearing that he indeed had been out of the state for nearly two months.
of the termination hearing.” In particular, he asserted that because the judge had been a part of the treatment team, the judge had “already evaluated the evidence and likely given input about the recommendation to terminate” to other members of the team.

The New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected Belyea’s appeal and noted that the defendant’s “argument rest[ed] upon the faulty premise that … when … [the judge] participated as a member of the drug court team and monitored the defendant’s progress, he acted in some role other than as a neutral and detached magistrate.” Instead, the court found that the trial judge “remained an impartial judicial officer,” and that there was nothing in the record to reflect that the judge “acted as an investigator, advocate, or prosecutor when participating with the drug court team.” The court observed further: “It is not uncommon for judges to acquire information about a case while sitting in their judicial capacity in one judicial setting and later to adjudicate the case without casting significant doubt on their ability to render a fair and impartial decision.” The trial judge in Belyea had “listened to current information on the defendant’s progress or problems in the Program” as part of the entire drug court team and considered “recommendations presented by individual members of the team, as a result of the defendant’s purported misconduct.”

With regard to Belyea’s contention of bias based on the trial judge’s prior participation as part of the treatment team, the state supreme court concluded that there was “no evidence that he had or considered facts not known by the drug treatment team or that he had personal, independent knowledge of any facts relied upon in ordering the defendant’s termination from the Program [sic].” Moreover, as the presiding judge of the drug court team, the trial judge had solely “learned information about the defendant’s compliant and noncompliant behavior in the context of the [team’s] weekly review meetings and in the presence of the entire team, and retained the authority to decide and impose any sanctions … for a participant’s misconduct.” Accordingly, the state supreme court determined that

49 Id. at 1085.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. The state supreme court also observed that the trial judge’s participation was “in the presence of the entire drug court team, which included a lawyer from the New Hampshire Public Defender Program.” Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1087.
56 Id. at 1086. The record also revealed that there were “no disputed evidentiary facts that … [the trial judge] relied upon terminating … [the defendant] from the program. At the hearing, the defendant agreed that he had left the state for two months without permission.” Id. This was a “clear violation” of the drug court policies, and the judge’s decision to terminate the defendant from the program and impose the previously suspended sentence was based solely on the defendant’s “admitted misconduct in fleeing the state, as well as his three prior Program [sic] sanctions.” Id.
no “objective, disinterested observer would … entertain significant doubt about … [the trial judge’s] impartiality.”

2. Idaho

Like New Hampshire, other courts have also taken the view that a specialty court judge can preside over termination hearings. For example, in State v. Rogers, the Idaho Supreme Court considered an appeal by a drug court participant who had been terminated from the program and sentenced for possession of a controlled substance. The defendant had initially pleaded guilty to possession, but the state agreed to a dismissal should the defendant successfully complete the drug court program. After the drug court judge “confronted Rogers with information suggesting Rogers had been attempting to solicit fellow drug court participants to enter into a prostitution ring or ‘adult entertainment business,’” the judge “terminated Rogers from the drug court program” and thereafter imposed a sentence on the original possession charge.

On appeal, Rogers alleged that his termination violated due process protections. The state supreme court determined that because Rogers pleaded guilty in order to enter into the drug court program, he then had a protected “liberty interest at stake as he … [would] no longer be able to assert his innocence if expelled from the program.” Because he had a liberty interest in remaining in the program, he was therefore “entitled to procedural due process before he … [could] be terminated from that program.” Notwithstanding this holding, however, the court also determined that the drug court judge could “preside over the termination proceedings,” as well as any ensuing sentencing hearing, and that such subsequent adjudicatory processes would satisfy procedural due process requirements.

3. Minnesota

57 Id. at 1086-87.
59 Id. at 882.
60 Id. at 883. Rogers had also previously violated drug court rules and was sanctioned, yet had “seemed to improve markedly [thereafter] and even earned praise for his performance from the drug court judge” on two occasions. Id.
61 Id. at 882-83.
62 Id. at 884. The court reasoned that a liberty interest was implicated because prior to his termination from the drug court program “he was living in society (subject to the restrictions of complying with the drug court program), and after his termination from … [the drug court program] he was incarcerated.” Id. at 885.
63 Id. at 886. The court also observed that “the neutral court may consider evidence which might not necessarily be admissible in a criminal trial, if such evidence is disclosed to Rogers prior to the hearing, is reliable, and would assist the court in making its determination.” Id.
Similarly, consider the court’s dicta in an unpublished Minnesota Court of Appeals case involving the termination of parental rights.64 Evidence in that case revealed that the children’s mother had “received nine sanctions for drug court violations” and also “had one missed [drug] test, one diluted [drug] test, and one positive test for cocaine.”65 After the trial court terminated her parental rights, and among her contentions on appeal, the appellant asserted that the trial judge “should have voluntarily removed himself as the judge … because he … had previous knowledge of facts outside of the record and preside[d] over the county’s drug court program.”66 The appellate court declined to rule on the contention because the parent had not properly objected at trial.67 Nonetheless, the court added, “In any event, we see no basis for removal.”68 The court found no evidence of bias or reason to question the judge’s impartiality and declared that “any knowledge the judge had of the appellant’s drug history was obtained in his judicial capacity” and not via his personal or private life.69 The court concluded, “Any information the district court judge obtained about appellant through her participation in the county’s drug court program was acquired in his judicial capacity, not his private life. Therefore, he was not required to disqualify himself under the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct.”70

4. Kentucky

Kentucky takes a similar view. In 2011 the Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary issued an ethics opinion “regarding recusal when the drug or mental health court judge will be the same judge presiding over a probation revocation hearing.”71 The ethics committee concluded that in general a specialty court judge may preside at a subsequent revocation hearing at which program termination serves as the basis for the revocation, and that “recusal would only be required in certain circumstances.”72 In particular, the committee opined that if the specialty court judge “receives the reason for the termination from the program in the course of his or her official duties, and no part of the evidence at a...
subsequent revocation hearing is dependent on the judge’s personal knowledge of any pertinent circumstances, no recusal is required.”

In formulating this opinion, the Kentucky ethics committee reasoned that a specialty court judge “by the very nature and purpose of the program, must remain familiar with the status of the participant, who has voluntarily elected to enter the program.” The committee observed further, however, that recusal could “be required in situations where information on which the revocation may be based comes from the judge’s ‘personal knowledge,’ i.e., information learned by the judge outside the regular drug or mental health court process.” The committee then identified an example that would likely require recusal as a situation in which the specialty court judge “personally observed the … [program] participant committing some act that would form or support the basis for termination from the program.”

5. Tennessee

By way of contrast, however, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals took a very different approach to the recusal question in State v. Stewart, by focusing on due process concerns. In Stewart the defendant claimed “that his due process rights were violated because the judge presiding over his probation revocation had previously served as a member of his drug court team and had received ex parte information regarding the defendant’s conduct at issue by virtue of his prior involvement.” The court agreed that due process required that a different judge, who had “not previously reviewed the same or related subject matter as part of the defendant’s drug court team,” must adjudicate the probation revocation proceedings. The defendant in Stewart had not been successful in his drug court participation, and accrued numerous program violations.

73 Id. at 2.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. In formulating its opinion, the committee observed that the “Kentucky Supreme Court has stated that drug court ‘is a court function, clearly laid out as an alternative sentencing program ….’” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Nicely, 326 S.W.3d 441, 444 (Ky. 2010) (emphasis in original). The committee also noted, “Ordinarily, ‘recusal is appropriate only when the information is derived from an extra-judicial source. Knowledge obtained in the course of earlier participation in the same case does not require that a judge recuse.’” See id. (quoting Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Ky. 1986)) (additional citation omitted in original).
78 Id. at *1.
79 Id.
80 See id. at *8-10. The appellate court observed that the case was “not a shining example of a successful drug court program intervention” and that as part of the program, “the defendant had ongoing issues with marijuana usage and repeatedly failed to comply with basic program requirements.” Id. at *8. He was also “sanctioned five or six times and sentenced to significant jail terms wholly outside of those envisioned by his original sentence or probation.” Id. at *8-*9. See also id. at *9-*10 (delineating a lengthy list of the defendant’s drug court program violations and sanctions).
Consequently, “a trial judge who had participated in a significant amount of the defendant’s drug court treatment, including his expulsion from the program,” presided over the defendant’s probation revocation hearing.\textsuperscript{81} The defendant “urged the trial judge to recuse himself because of his prior participation on the drug court team,” but the judge declined, “citing the practical difficulties of bringing in a new judge every time someone violates their drug court contract.”\textsuperscript{82} The trial judge then found that the defendant had violated his probation terms, and the court sentenced him to jail time.\textsuperscript{83}

On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals determined that due process bars “any member of the defendant’s drug court from adjudicating a subsequent parole revocation when the violations or conduct at issue in both forums involves the same or related subject matter.”\textsuperscript{84} Given the liberty interest at stake, the court first observed, “It is now firmly established that a probationer is entitled to due process when a State attempts to remove his probationary status and have him incarcerated.”\textsuperscript{85} The court then identified the minimum required procedural protections and described the right to a “neutral hearing body” as “[o]ne of the most fundamental” of the due process rights.\textsuperscript{86} In finding a violation of due process in \textit{Stewart}, the court reasoned that “the role of a judge in the drug courts program is, by its very nature, almost the polar opposite of ‘neutral and detached.’”\textsuperscript{87} In great detail, the court highlighted the following array of due process concerns with regard to a drug court judge’s neutrality in later presiding at a defendant’s probation revocation hearing:

- Drug court judges are expected “\textit{to step beyond} their traditionally independent and objective arbiter roles.”\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Id.} at *10-*11.
\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Id.} at *11. In seeking recusal, the defendant argued “that the judge would already be familiar with the materials that would comprise most of the State’s proof at the probation revocation by virtue of his [prior] involvement.” \textit{Id.} Although the trial judge denied the motion to recuse, he “stated that he would not mind getting further guidance from the Court of Criminal Appeals on the issue as it was likely to arise again in the future.” \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Id.} at *12.
\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Id.} (emphasis in original).
\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Id.} at *13.
\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Id.} The court further opined that “a defendant’s rights are plainly violated when his probation revocation case is reviewed by someone other than a ‘neutral and detached’ arbiter” and that in Tennessee, trial judges serve as the probation revocation adjudicators.” \textit{Id.} at *14 and *14, n.1.
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Id.} at *14.
\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Id.} at *15 (emphasis in original) (quoting from Key Components, \textit{supra} note 4, at 15). The court further explained that under Tennessee law, drug court treatment programs are required to operate “according to the principles established by the Drug Courts Standards Committee of the National Association of Drug Court Professionals.” \textit{Stewart}, at *15. \textit{See also TENN. CODE ANN.} § 16-22-104 (West 2013) (setting forth ten general principles for the establishment and operation of drug court programs). Given the lack of further legislative elucidation of these ten principles, the court turned to the National Association of Drug Court Professionals’ program guidelines for further clarification. \textit{Stewart}, at *15.
• Drug court judges are expected to “issue praise for regular attendance or a period of clean drug tests, offer encouragement, and even award the participants tokens of accomplishment during open court ceremonies” for program successes.89

• Drug court judges should have “frequent status hearings and maintain regular communications with other program staff to uncover noncompliance,” should instill a “fear that big brother is always watching,” and address program infractions “with responses ranging from disparaging remarks to jail time.”90

• Drug court judges are “an integral part of the defendant’s ‘therapeutic team’” and are “expected to ‘play an active role in the [participant’s] drug treatment process.’”91 Accordingly, a drug court judge “will necessarily find it difficult, if not impossible, to reach the constitutionally-required level of detachment when dealing with a course of conduct … [that was] previously reviewed as a member of a drug court team.”92

• Drug court judges will have participated in team decisions about treatment and services, and thus will “develop a stake in the success or failure” of the selected programs.93

• Drug court judges are participating in a collaborative process of decision-making that “poses an additional threat to the impartiality of any judge who would later adjudicate a defendant’s probation revocation involving the same or related conduct.”94

• Drug court judges will have received access to a “considerable amount of ex parte information … as a necessary component of the drug court process.”95

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89 Id. (citing Key Components, supra note 4, at 13). The court reasoned that such repeated praiseworthy activities could lead the prosecution to “question a judge’s impartiality.” Stewart, at *16.
90 Id. The court further observed that the judge’s imposition of disciplinary actions “could cause the defendant to reasonably question the judge’s impartiality when reviewing the same subject matter in a different forum later.” Id. at *17.
91 Id. *18 (quoting Key Components, supra note 4, at 2, 7).
92 Stewart, at *18.
93 See id. at *19 (leading the court to question a drug court judge’s detachment in later proceedings).
94 Id. at *20. The court suggested that a drug court judge might subordinate his or her own views to those of the treatment team, could put certain decisions up to a vote of the treatment team members, and generally be personally invested in “prior collaborative team decisions” that could “cloud the exercise of his or her own individualized, detached, and impartial review” of later adjudicatory processes. Id. at *21.
95 Id. at *22. The court identified as troubling potential ex parte contacts such as frequent treatment team communications about a defendant’s program participation, and “frequent interactions between the participants and drug court judges, in which the participants will not be represented by counsel.” Id. at *23-*25. The court further opined that “it simply strains credulity
Drug court judges, as part of participation in and leadership of the drug court process, are privy “to a considerable amount of information about the defendant’s conduct that would not normally be relevant to adjudicating a probation revocation” and will likely be aware of other challenges or problems such as a “participant’s mental illnesses, sexually transmitted diseases, domestic violence, unemployment, and homelessness.”

Accordingly, the court in Stewart concluded that a drug court judge who participated as part of, and presided over, a defendant’s drug court team could not “function as a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body … for alleged probation violations that … [were] based on the same or related subject matter” that the drug court team had previously reviewed. In reaching its decision, the court specifically rejected the reasoning of both the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Rogers and the New Hampshire Supreme Court in State v. Belyea. In addition,
given that the court in Stewart reached its conclusion on due process grounds, the court found it “unnecessary to address whether the [Tennessee] Code of Judicial Conduct … would also generally require recusal” in similar cases.\(^{100}\)

Of note, approximately six months following the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals decision in Stewart, the state’s Judicial Ethics Committee provided an advisory opinion on the very question left unaddressed in Stewart: whether the state’s Code of Judicial Conduct will “permit a judge, who is a member of a drug court team, to preside over the revocation/sentencing hearing of a defendant who is in the drug court program.”\(^{101}\) In contrast to the court’s sweeping language in Stewart, the state’s ethics committee opined that the state’s Code of Judicial Conduct “does not automatically require recusal,” and that recusal is required “only if the judge determines that he/she cannot be impartial.”\(^{102}\) In contrast to Stewart, the ethics committee relied favorably on both the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Belyea\(^{103}\) and the Idaho Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Rogers,\(^{104}\) and quoted both cases with approval.\(^{105}\) Moreover, the ethics committee added that “[i]t appears that judicial ethical considerations are moving in the direction taken in Belyea as to allowing ‘special’ courts to receive ex parte communications.”\(^{106}\) As for Stewart, the ethics committee merely referenced the case and its holding, and then observed that the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals had decided the case “upon constitutional rather than ethical grounds and … [took] no position as to the latter.”\(^{107}\)

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\(^{102}\) Id.

\(^{103}\) See Belyea, 999 A.2d at 1085-86 (finding no prejudgment of the facts or question as to a drug court judge’s impartiality where the judge had acquired information and knowledge while serving in a judicial capacity on the drug court team). For a further discussion of Belyea, see supra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.

\(^{104}\) See Rogers, 170 P.2d at 886 (determining that a drug court judge may serve in subsequent program termination proceedings and sentencing hearings). For a further discussion of Rogers, see supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.


\(^{106}\) Id., at 4. In support of this proposition, the committee referenced the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct and quoted from the ABA’s comments to “Rule 2.9 the special considerations granted in this regard to ‘problem-solving’ courts.” Id. See also supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text (discussing the 2007 ABA Model Code and provisions included therein pertaining to specialty courts).

\(^{107}\) Tenn. Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 11-01, supra note 101, at 4. The committee did recognize that Stewart had held that “the due process clause prevented a judge who had been a member of the defendant’s drug court team from later conducting a probation revocation hearing as to the defendant” for alleged violations “‘based on the same or related subject matter that has been reviewed’ by the judge as a member of the drug court team.” See id. (quoting Stewart).
Somewhat inexplicably, the Tennessee ethics committee made no attempt to reconcile its decision, which focused on judicial ethics, with the *Stewart* holding that was grounded on due process considerations. Instead, the ethics committee declared that in Tennessee the courts follow “the same ‘reasonableness’ standard as was applied in *Belyea*. That is, the judge must take the more objective, rather than subjective, approach and ‘ask what a reasonable, disinterested person knowing all the relevant facts would think about his or her impartiality.’” 108 In turn, a judge’s decision on recusal should be made on a “case-by-case basis,” and for a drug court judge “the outcome would necessarily depend upon the specific information the judge acquired as a member of the drug court team.” 109 Accordingly, the ethics committee concluded “that serving as a functioning member of the drug court team does not in and of itself require recusal of the judge in a revocation hearing.” 110 This opinion, of course, appears to run directly counter to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals decision in *Stewart* in which the court sweepingly declared that due process precludes a judge who was a member of a drug court team from later presiding over a probation revocation hearing in which the probation violations are the same as those that were before the drug court team. 111

Can the 2011 Tennessee ethics opinion and the court’s due process decision in *Stewart* be reconciled? Although the court’s language in *Stewart* was broad, the specific facts are instructive. Upon reviewing the record, the court observed, “[W]e are additionally troubled by the four or five occasions where the defendant in this case was ‘sanctioned’ to significant jail time by the drug court team during the two years he participated in the program.” 112 This resulted in the defendant being “appreciably worse off from a punitive perspective than if he had chosen not to participate in the drug court program at all.” 113 Finding this problematic, the court urged judges who oversee drug court programs to assure that the programs “focus[] on drug addiction therapy and treatment, and recogniz[e] that, for good reason, punishment with substantial periods of incarceration is [the] bailiwick of the traditional criminal justice system.” 114 By way of contrast, the ethics committee referenced no comparable egregious facts

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108 See id. (quoting Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), and referencing the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s approach in *Belyea*, 999 A.2d at 1085-86).
109 Tenn. Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 11-01, supra note 101, at 4. The committee added that under “the ‘reasonableness’ standard, recusal may be required in one case and not required in another.” Id.
110 Id. at 5. The committee added further that recusal would be necessary “only if the appearance of impartiality should surface in the face of a fair and honest ‘objective standard’ analysis by the judge predicated upon the specific facts developed in each particular case.” Id.
112 Id. at *37. The court added that “the net effect of these sanctions appears to be that approximately a half-year has been tacked onto the overall … sentence.” Id.
113 Id. The court seemed troubled that a therapeutic form of process could result in the addition of “significant amounts of jail time” as sanctions. Id. at *39.
114 Id. at *41. The court added, “When necessary, truly recalcitrant participants may be swiftly returned to the traditional system via the drug court expulsion process.” Id.
pertaining to the matter under its review. Instead, the ethics committee noted that individuals who participated in the drug court program pertaining to the matter then under review each executed a detailed “waiver, consenting to the drug court judge’s receiving a broad range of ex parte communications regarding the matter.” After quoting the waiver in full, the ethics committee concluded that the waiver authorized the drug court judge “to have what would appear to be access to all relevant documents and records but limits its use to ‘status hearings, progress reports, and sentencing hearings.’” Accordingly, the ethics committee declined to require an automatic recusal and determined that a case-by-case review was appropriate.

B. State Codes of Judicial Conduct

Roughly half the states have adopted the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. As discussed above, the 2007 Model Code recognizes the unique nature of specialty courts and includes some coverage of ex parte communications rules for such courts. As described in this Section, however, a number of states have promulgated variations of the 2007 Model Code to address specialty courts more specifically.

1. Tennessee

115 Indeed, the committee identified virtually no facts with regard to the specific matter for which the drug court judge had requested an ethics opinion. See Tenn. Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 11-01, supra note 101, at 2-3 (setting forth the only references in the opinion to the underlying case).

116 Id. at 2. The waiver authorized disclosure to drug court team members of communications such as “progress notes, medical diagnosis, testing, drug results, attendance records, results of medical testing and drug screens, HIV medical records, counselor and social worker notes and summaries, ... and all other records associated with rehabilitation and treatment.”

117 Id. at 3-4. Moreover, the waiver provided that recipients of information obtained throughout the process could “redisclose it only in connection with their official duties as members of the … Drug Court Team.”

118 See Geyh et al., supra note 8, at 1-6 - 1-7 (observing that “[b]y 2013, 24 jurisdictions had adopted the 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct, although most with revisions to various sections”). For links to documents that describe the differences between the various state enactments and the text of the 2007 Model Code, see American Bar Ass’n, Comparison of State Codes of Judicial Conduct to Model Code of Judicial Conduct, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/judicial_ethics_regulation/comparison.html.

119 See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
Subsequent to both *Stewart* and the 2011 Tennessee Ethics Committee opinion discussed above, the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted a new Code of Judicial Conduct that became effective on July 1, 2012. Tennessee’s new judicial conduct code is modeled in large part on the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, but with some differences. With regard to specialty courts such as drug courts and mental health courts, like the 2007 ABA Model Code, the revised Tennessee Code includes a general recognition of these courts in the Code’s “application” section. In addition, and specifically with regard to ex parte communications, the new Tennessee Code provides the following:

When serving on a mental health court or a drug court, judges may assume a more interactive role with parties, treatment providers, probation officers, social workers, and others. However, if this ex parte communication becomes an issue at a subsequent adjudicatory proceeding in which the judge is presiding, the judge shall either (1) disqualify himself or herself if the judge gained personal knowledge of disputed facts … or the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned … or (2) make disclosure of such communications subject to the [Code’s] waiver provisions ….

Accordingly, Tennessee’s Supreme Court has adopted an approach that is closer to the 2011 Ethics Committee opinion’s advisory opinion that judges in specialty courts are to consider recusal motions on a case-by-case basis, rather than the

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Some states, including Tennessee, have created courts in which judges are authorized by court rules to act in nontraditional ways. For example, judges presiding in drug courts and monitoring the progress of participants in those courts’ programs may be authorized and even encouraged to communicate directly with social workers, probation officers and others outside the context of their usual judicial role as independent decision makers on issues of fact and law. Judges serving on such courts shall comply with this Code except to the extent laws or court rules provide and permit otherwise.

*Id.*

124 *Id.* at Tenn. S. Ct. R. 10, RJC 2.9 cmt. 4 (internal citations to other sections of the Code omitted).
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’ categorical approach based on due process considerations set forth in *Stewart*.

2. *Idaho*

By way of contrast, consider the Idaho Supreme Court’s approach to the same issue. In 2008, the court amended the ex parte contacts provisions of the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct by adding the following subsection that focuses specifically on specialty courts:

(f) A judge presiding over a criminal or juvenile problem solving court may initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications with members of the problem solving court team at staffings, or by written documents provided to all members of the problem solving court team. A judge who has received any such ex parte communication regarding the defendant or juvenile while presiding over a case in a problem solving court shall not preside over any subsequent proceeding to terminate that defendant or juvenile from the problem solving court, probation violation proceeding, or sentencing proceeding in that case.125

The Idaho Supreme Court added the foregoing provision following a very restrictive March 2008 Idaho Judicial Council ethics opinion which “stated that ‘e-mails, telephone calls or written communications from counselors, drug court coordinators, [or] prosecutors done in an ex parte manner are all prohibited except for those limited situations permitted by the [former] Canons.’”126 The opinion also directed that the parties must have representation in attendance when the specialty court judge is present at a staffing.127 The ethics opinion accordingly created a challenge for Idaho specialty courts described as follows: “If counsel does not attend all court sessions and staffings, how can judges [ethically] participate as part of the problem-solving court team …?”128 Another concern was the “possible infringement of a defendant’s rights when a judge who had been exposed to ex parte communications presides over subsequent proceedings

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125 IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(7)(f), at 11 (2013), available at http://www.judicialcouncil.idaho.gov/Idaho%20Code%20of%20Judicial%20Conduct.pdf. The term “staffing,” as used in the subsection, was added in 2012 and is defined to mean “a regularly scheduled, informal conference not occurring in open court, the purpose of which is to permit the presiding judge and others, including counsel, to discuss a participant’s progress in the problem solving court, treatment recommendations, or responses to participant compliance issues.” See id. at 4 (including the term in a list of “Terminology” definitions, and noting an adoption date of Nov. 30, 2012, with an effective date of Jan. 1, 2013).
127 Id.
128 Id.
involving the termination of the defendant from a problem-solving court, a
probation revocation hearing, or sentencing.”\textsuperscript{129}

In response to the 2008 ethics opinion that called into question these
practices in the specialty courts, the Idaho Supreme Court “sought a wide range of
views” and ultimately adopted amendments to its Code of Judicial Conduct
specifically regarding special courts.\textsuperscript{130} The new subsection – Canon 3(b)(7)(f) –
both recognizes the role of specialty courts, and also authorizes the court to
consider ex parte communications at staffings and via written documents that are
provided to all members of the specialty court team.\textsuperscript{131} The court also added a
provision allowing a judge to “initiate, permit, or consider communications
dealing with substantive matters or issues on the merits in the absence of a party
who had notice … and did not appear” at scheduled court proceedings “including
a conference, hearing, or trial.”\textsuperscript{132} Finally, however, the Idaho Supreme Court
elected to adopt a blanket rule that any specialty court judge “who has received
any … ex parte communication regarding the defendant or juvenile while
presiding over a case in a problem solving court shall not preside over any
subsequent” proceeding for program termination, a probation violation, or
sentencing.\textsuperscript{133}

3. Additional States

Like Idaho, a number of other states have gone beyond the 2007 Model
Code’s provisions relating to ex parte communications in specialty courts to
provide expanded or more specific coverage. Ten of these states, in addition to
Idaho, have adopted specific subsections or unique comments that focus on
activities in specialty courts.\textsuperscript{134} For example, Arizona’s 2009 Code of Judicial

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{129} Id. Recall that in State v. Rogers, 170 P.2d 881, 885-86 (Idaho 2007), the Idaho Supreme Court
recognized that an individual participating in a drug court program has a protected liberty interest
at stake in determinations whether to terminate that person’s participation; however, the court also
concluded that although the defendant was entitled to a due process hearing, the drug court judge
could “preside over the termination hearings.” For a detailed discussion of Rogers, see supra notes
58-63 and accompanying text.
  \item \textsuperscript{130} See Henderson, supra note 126, at 48 (also indicating that the court consulted with judges,
court administrators, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and the state’s Drug Court and Mental Health
Court Coordinating Committee).
  \item \textsuperscript{131} See IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(7)(f), supra note 125, at 11.
  \item \textsuperscript{132} See id., Canon 3(B)(7)(e), at 10. See also Henderson, supra note 126, at 48 (observing that this
“provision clarifies ex prohibition” with regard to scheduled court proceedings).
  \item \textsuperscript{133} See IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(7)(f), supra note 125, at 11. This
decision, of course, represented a reversal, of sorts, from the same court’s 2007 decision in Rogers
that due process did not require that a subsequent termination proceeding must always be
considered by a judge different from the previously presiding drug court judge. See Rogers, 170
P.2d, at 885-86. See also Neitz, supra note 31, at 124 (suggesting that this aspect of the “Idaho
approach recognizes that ex parte communications can sometimes be useful, but should not be a
determining factor in the resolution of a case”).
  \item \textsuperscript{134} These additional states with unique provisions include Arizona, Hawaii, Ohio, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Kansas, Maryland, Iowa, and New Mexico. See infra notes 135-55 and
accompanying text.
\end{itemize}
Conduct added an additional subsection to Rule 2.9 covering ex parte communications, which provides:

(6) A judge may engage in ex parte communications when serving on problem-solving courts, if such communications are authorized by protocols known and consented to by the parties or by local rules.135

Similarly, in adopting the 2007 Model Code, Hawaii crafted the following additional subsection regarding ex parte communications:

(6) A judge may initiate, permit, or consider an ex parte communication when serving on a therapeutic or specialty court, such as a mental health court or drug court, provided that the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, substantive, or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication and any factual information received that is not part of the record is timely disclosed to the parties.136

Ohio has promulgated a comparable provision, which states:

(6) A judge may initiate, receive, permit, or consider an ex parte communication when administering a specialized docket, provided the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, substantive, or tactical advantage while in the specialized docket program as a result of the ex parte communication.137

Nebraska has similarly created a variation on the 2007 ABA Model Code by adopting the following additional subsection pertaining to specialty courts:

(6) A judge may initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications when serving on therapeutic or problem-solving courts, mental health courts, or drug courts, if such communications are authorized by protocols known and consented to by the parties. In this capacity, judges may assume a more

interactive role with parties, treatment providers, probation officers, social workers, and others.\textsuperscript{138}

In contrast to the more detailed subsections described above, North Dakota and Oklahoma have promulgated narrower provisions that focus on party consent. Indeed, both North Dakota’s and Oklahoma’s versions of the ex parte rules include the following identical language:

(4) With the consent of all parties, the judge and court personnel may have ex parte communication with those involved in a specialized court team. Any party may expressly waive the right to receive that information.\textsuperscript{139}

Rather than adding a separate subsection to its version of Rule 2.9, when Kansas adopted the 2007 ABA Model Code, the state promulgated a unique comment that cross-references a different court rule pertaining to specialty courts. In particular, the comment provides:

(4) A judge may initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications as authorized by Supreme Court Rule 109A when serving on therapeutic or problem-solving courts, mental health courts, or drug courts. In this capacity, judges may assume a more interactive role with parties, treatment providers, probation officers, social workers, and others.\textsuperscript{140}

In turn, Kansas Supreme Court Rule 109A sets forth additional provisions authorizing and regulating specialty courts for persons with mental illness or substance addictions.\textsuperscript{141} The rule authorizes ex parte communications between the specialty court judge and members of the “problem-solving court team, either at a team meeting or in a document provided to all members of the team.”\textsuperscript{142}

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
\bibitem{139} N.D. COURT RULES, RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, Rule 2.9(4) (2012), available at http://www.ndcourts.gov/rules/judicial/frameset.htm; OKLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Chap. 1, App. 4, Rule 2.9(4) (2011), available at http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=461667. Comment 4 to the North Dakota rule adds, “A judge may initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications expressly authorized by law, such as when serving on therapeutic or problem-solving courts, mental health courts, or drug courts.” N.D. COURT RULES, RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, Rule 2.9(4), Comment (4). Similarly, Oklahoma’s version includes virtually the same comment, except it refers to “specialized courts” rather than therapeutic or problem-solving courts. OKLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Chap. 1, App. 4, Rule 2.9(4), Comment (4).
\bibitem{142} Id. § (b).
\end{thebibliography}
Moreover, the rule specifically allows the specialty court judge who has received ex parte communications as part of presiding over the specialty court team to preside over subsequent proceedings involving a defendant provided that the judge discloses “the existence and, if known, the nature of” the ex parte information, and both the defendant and the prosecution consent.\textsuperscript{143} Accordingly, under this latter provision, if a defendant objects to having the specialty court judge preside over a later program termination, probation revocation, or sentencing proceeding, the rule would require the judge’s recusal.\textsuperscript{144} Unlike Idaho’s unique adaptation of the 2007 ABA Model Code, however, the Kansas approach does not create a blanket requirement for recusal, and both parties may consent to allowing the specialty court judge to preside.\textsuperscript{145}

Like Kansas, Maryland’s version of the 2007 ABA Model Code pertaining to ex parte communications includes a cross-reference to another procedural rule; the Maryland provision states:

\begin{quote}
(6) When serving in a problem-solving court program of a Circuit Court or the District Court pursuant to Rule 16-206, a judge may initiate, permit, and consider ex parte communications in conformance with the established protocols for the operation of the program if the parties have expressly consented to those protocols.\textsuperscript{146}
\end{quote}

In turn, Maryland Rule 16-206 sets forth general guidelines for specialty courts in the state, and delineates a process for the planning and approval of specialty courts.\textsuperscript{147} The rule also includes official commentary suggesting that a specialty court judge should be sensitive to any prior receipt of ex parte communications in any ensuing post-termination proceedings.\textsuperscript{148}

Although they did not adopt unique rules pertaining to specialty court judges, two additional states – Iowa and New Mexico – departed from the proffered language in the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct via the adoption of state-specific comments pertaining to specialty courts. First, Iowa

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{143} Id. §§ (c)(1)-(2).
\item \textsuperscript{144} Id. §§ (c)(2).
\item \textsuperscript{145} See \textit{IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT}, Canon 3(B)(7)(f), \textit{supra} note 125, at 11; see also \textit{supra} note 133 and accompanying text (describing Idaho’s across-the-board requirement that a specialty court judge who has received ex parte communications while leading the specialty court not preside over subsequent legal proceedings involving the same defendant who was a part of the specialty court program).
\item \textsuperscript{146} MD. RULE 16-813, Rule 2.9(6) (2010), \textit{available at} \textit{http://www.courts.state.md.us/rules/reports/codeofjudicialconduct2010.pdf}.
\item \textsuperscript{147} MD. RULE 16-206(a)-(c) (2010).
\item \textsuperscript{148} See id. at 16-206(e), Committee Note (providing that in the consideration of “whether a judge should be disqualified … from post-termination proceedings involving a participant who has been terminated from a problem-solving court program, the judge should be sensitive to any exposure to ex parte communications or inadmissible information the judge may have received while the participant was in the program”).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
modified the official comments to the “Application” section of the Model Code by including a unique comment pertaining almost exclusively to drug courts (and not other specialty courts). In contrast to the comparable section of the 2007 ABA Model Code, which provides that “local rules” may take priority in authorizing conduct by specialty court judges not otherwise permitted under the rules, the Iowa provision instead references other “law” regarding specialty courts that can take precedence over conduct permitted by the Iowa rules. In turn, the Iowa Code defines “law” broadly to include not only “court rules,” but also “statutes, constitutional provisions, and decisional law.” Similarly, New Mexico expanded both the rule pertaining to ex parte communications and one of the comments to its version of the ex parte rule to provide a broader scope of applicable, permissive source law for specialty courts than under the 2007 ABA Model Code. Like Iowa and the 2007 ABA Model Code, the New Mexico Code defines “law” to “encompass[] court rules as well as statutes, constitutional provisions, and decisional law.” With regard to its version of the ex parte communications rule, however, New Mexico goes somewhat further in the text of the rule than the 2007 ABA Model Code by specifically providing in its rule that a “judge may initiate, permit, or consider any ex parte communication when expressly authorized by law, rule, or Supreme Court order to do so.” In addition, New Mexico’s comment to its ex parte rule with regard to judges in

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> In Iowa, many districts have formed drug courts. Judges presiding in drug courts may be authorized and even encouraged to communicate directly with social workers, probation officers, and others outside the context of their usual judicial role as independent decision makers on issues of fact and law. When the law specifically authorizes conduct not otherwise permitted under these rules, that law takes precedence over the provisions set forth in the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct. Nevertheless, judges serving on drug courts and other “problem solving” courts shall comply with this Code except to the extent the law provides and permits otherwise.

Id.

150 Compare id. (authorizing other “law” to take priority over the Iowa Code provisions), with ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Application § I cmt. 3, supra note 15 (authorizing “local rules” to take priority over conflicting Model Code provisions).

151 See IOWA CT. R. CH. 51, IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Terminology, supra note 149, at 3 (defining “law”). In this regard, the Iowa Code has the same broad definition of “law” as does the 2007 ABA Model Code. See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Terminology, supra note 15 (defining “law”). The ABA Code, however, only references “local rules” with regard to specialty courts in the comments to its “application” section. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Application § I cmt. 3, supra note 15.


153 See id., Terminology, at 4 (defining “law” for purposes of the code).

specialty courts also specifically references authorization by “law, rule, or Supreme Court order.”

V. RECOMMENDATIONS TO REVISE THE TEXAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Texas has not adopted the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Nonetheless, jurisdictions around Texas have been actively developing a wide array of specialty courts. In addition, the Texas Legislature has given significant recognition to specialty courts. During the 2013 regular legislative session, the Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bill 462 relating to specialty court programs in the state. In part, the legislation consolidated into a single chapter of the Texas Government Code existing provisions pertaining to drug court programs, family drug court programs, mental health court programs, and veterans court programs that had previously been scattered across the Family Code, the Health and Safety Code, and the Government Code. As noted by the bill’s sponsor following the conclusion of the 2013 regular legislative session, however, Senate Bill 462 was also intended to “improve[] oversight of specialty court programs by requiring them to register with the criminal justice division of the Office of the Governor and follow programmatic best practices in order to receive state and federal grant funds.” Moreover, Senate Bill 462 added new language to the Texas Government Code mandating that specialty court programs “shall … comply with all programmatic best practices recommended by the

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155 N.M. RULES ANN. CH. 21, N.M. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, § 21-209, cmt. 4, at 44. In full, Comment 4 provides:

(4) A judge may initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications expressly authorized by law, rule, or Supreme Court order, such as when serving on therapeutic or problem-solving courts, mental health courts, or drug courts. In this capacity, judges may assume a more interactive role with parties, treatment providers, probation officers, social workers, and others.

Id. In contrast, the 2007 ABA Model Code has almost identical language for this comment, but only includes the phrase, “expressly authorized by law” – although “law” has the broad definition set forth in the Code. See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2, Rule 2.9, cmt. 4, & Terminology, supra note 15.


159 Tex. Sen. Research Center, Bill Analysis, at 1, Tex. S.B. 462, 83rd Leg., R.S. (2013), available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/83R/analysis/pdf/SB00462F.pdf#navpanes=0. The statement of intent also indicates that the new law requires the Governor’s Specialty Courts Advisory Council “to recommend programmatic best practices to the criminal justice division.” Id. This is consistent with a gubernatorial executive order also calling for advice on best practices for specialty courts. See Ex. Order RP 77 – Relating to the reauthorization of the operation of the Governor’s Criminal Justice Council (Feb. 28, 2012), available at http://governor.state.tx.us/news/executive-order/16995/.
Specialty Courts Advisory Council … and approved by the Texas Judicial Council.”

The recommended programmatic best practices for Texas specialty courts have included the expectation for “adherence to the Ten Key Components and research-based best practices for specialty courts.” As described by the Texas Criminal Justice Advisory Council, the National Association of Drug Court Professionals developed “the Ten Key Components as essential characteristics specialty courts must embody.” In turn, the Texas Legislature has codified these key components for Texas specialty courts. Of significance to the discussion of a judge’s role in a specialty court, these codified program characteristics contemplate an “ongoing judicial interaction with program participants.” Accordingly, the state legislature has not only recognized that a judge is engaged in a different, non-traditional role when presiding over a specialty court program, but has also codified the expectation that judges in such programs will have ongoing interactions with the participants. Unfortunately, however, the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, unlike the 2007 Model ABA Code or its implementation in many states, does not address the unique role performed by judges in specialty courts, and it is therefore time for the Texas Supreme Court to amend the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct to recognize such courts.

What is the best approach for amending the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct to recognize the unique role of judges in specialty courts – particularly with regard to ex parte communications and disqualifications or recusals? By not having acted as of yet, the Texas Supreme Court has the opportunity to study the actions by other states and adopt provisions that best serve the expanding use of specialty courts in Texas. Amending the ex parte communications section of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct in a manner comparable to several other states’ adoption of provisions comparable to the 2007 ABA Model Code would provide a
significant improvement over current law with regard to specialty courts.\footnote{165} One approach to doing so would be to amend Canon 3(B)(8) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct pertaining to the prohibition on ex parte communications by amending the exception set forth in subsection (e) and adding a new subsection (f), as follows:

\begin{verbatim}(e) considering an \textit{ex parte} communication expressly authorized by law, which for purposes of this exception includes statutes, constitutional provisions, decisional law, and state or local court rules or orders; and

(f) A judge presiding over a specialty court program such as a drug court, family drug court, mental health court, or veterans court may initiate, permit, or consider \textit{ex parte} communications with members of the specialty court team at staffing conferences or meetings, or by written documents provided to all members of the specialty court team, consistent with waiver and consent protocols developed and implemented by the specialty court program. In presiding over a specialty court, a judge may assume a more interactive role with parties, treatment providers, probation officers, social workers, and others.\footnote{166}
\end{verbatim}

The proposed amendments to subsection (e) represent an amalgam of the Iowa and New Mexico approaches described above.\footnote{167} In addition, adopting this language would recognize that specialty court programs are still evolving and different jurisdictions will likely approach problem-solving courts in differing ways.\footnote{168} The language suggested for subsection (f) creates an exception specifically addressed to specialty courts, and the text is drawn from the approaches of several states.\footnote{169} In addition, the four specific types of specialty courts identified in the proposed language are not intended to be exclusive, but

\footnotetext{165}{The Texas Supreme Court might wish to consider adopting additional portions or all of the 2007 ABA Model Code, but the scope of such a review is beyond the scope of this Article.}

\footnotetext{166}{The suggested language would amend \textsc{tex. code jud. conduct}, Canon 3(B)(8), \textit{supra} note 14. The proposed new language is underlined.}

\footnotetext{167}{See \textit{supra} notes 149-155 and accompanying text.}

\footnotetext{168}{See CJAC Report, \textit{supra} note 1, at 7 (observing that “the size and diversity of Texas prevents a one-size-fits-all approach”). The Texas Supreme Court could also adopt a comment to the proposed, revised subsection (e) that incorporates the 2007 ABA Model Code’s focus on local rules for specialty courts. See \textsc{aba model code of judicial conduct}, Application § 1 cmt. 3, \textit{supra} note 15 (authorizing “local rules” to take priority over conflicting Model Code provisions); see also, \textit{supra} note 29 and accompanying text (quoting the ABA comment). For example, the Texas Supreme Court could consider the following approach for such a new comment: “When local rules establishing a specialty court specifically authorize conduct not otherwise permitted under this Code, they take precedence over the provisions set forth in the Code. Nevertheless, in providing the authority over specialty courts shall comply with this Code except to the extent local rules provide and permit otherwise.” This proffered language closely tracks the 2007 ABA Model Code’s comparable comment. See \textit{id.}}

\footnotetext{169}{See \textit{supra} notes 125-45 and accompanying text (notably, Idaho, Nebraska, and Kansas).}
track those four types of programs identified during the 2013 Texas legislative session in S.B. 462. Finally, the proffered language relating to waiver and consent provisions is consistent with one of the Texas Criminal Justice Policy Council’s focus areas.

In addition to language pertaining to ex parte communications, the Texas Supreme Court should also consider adding language pertaining to disqualifications or recusals. Canon 3(B)(1) requires that a judge not decide a matter “in which disqualification or recusal is appropriate.” Moreover, a “judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice,” and a “judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice ....” As discussed above, Idaho has adopted a firm rule that if the specialty court judge receives ex parte communications while presiding over the specialty court team, the judge “shall not preside over any subsequent proceeding to terminate that defendant or juvenile from the problem solving court, probation violation proceeding, or sentencing proceeding in that case.” That also appears to be the approach of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, although not that of the Tennessee Supreme Court. This Article does not advocate a blanket requirement for recusal from subsequent proceedings simply because the specialty court judge received ex parte communications in the course of presiding over the specialty court program. Typically, courts consider recusal motions on a case-by-case basis. Why should this type of situation be any different, particularly if the specialty court participant signed a thorough consent and waiver form? Accordingly, one possible approach would be for the Texas Supreme Court to consider adding a new subsection (12) to Canon 3(B) pertaining to a judge’s adjudicative responsibilities, as follows:

(12) If ex parte communications permitted by this Canon become an issue at a subsequent adjudicatory proceeding at which a specialty court judge is presiding, the specialty court judge shall either (1) recuse himself or herself if the judge gained personal knowledge of disputed facts outside the context of the specialty court program, or (2) make disclosure of any such ex parte communications.

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170 See S.B. 462, supra note 157.
171 See CJAC Report, supra note 1, at 7 (recommending the continued “development of standard consent and waiver forms for use by programs to ensure due process rights of participants are protected”).
172 TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(1), supra note 14.
173 Id. Canon 3(B)(5)-(6).
174 See IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(7)(f), at 11, supra note 125 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 77-124 and accompanying text.
176 This proposal closely tracks language from one of the official comments set forth in the 2012 Tennessee Code of Judicial Conduct. See TENN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Tenn. S. Ct. R. 10, RJC 2.9 cmt. 4, supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. As an alternative, this proposed language could be included at the end of proposed subsection (B)(8)(f), described above. See supra text accompanying note 166.
The foregoing language is intended to address the possible need for a recusal depending on the nature and extent of the ex parte communications that might arise as part of an individual’s participation in a specialty court program. It calls for a case-by-case assessment, rather than employing a blanket rule. Indeed, depending on the nature of the ex parte communications, as well as the extent of any signed waivers or consent documentation, there might be no need for recusal in a particular case. Moreover, if the revised rules permit certain ex parte communications from, for example, treatment team members at a staffing meeting, the presiding specialty court judge will have received that information while performing a now permissible judicial role – and not gained it via “personal knowledge.”

VI. CONCLUSION

Specialty courts now comprise a significant and growing part of the Texas judicial landscape. Moreover, given both legislative and gubernatorial support for specialty courts in Texas, this growth will likely continue. To assure that there is appropriate recognition and coverage of this new role for a growing number of Texas judges who preside over specialty courts, it is time for the Texas Supreme Court to follow the lead of a number of states from around the country and amend the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct.

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178 See Meyer, supra note 10, at 205-06 (asserting that “[w]hen a drug court judge receives information from a treatment provider or other source, this would be subject to the rules on ex parte contacts” and “does not qualify as ‘personal knowledge’” requiring disqualification because “the judge has not personally observed the events in question;” but, suggesting that judges should “recuse themselves from any adjudication arising out of events that they did witness, such as a participant appearing in court intoxicated or a participant attempting to escape”). In addition, separate and apart from issues pertaining to ex parte communications, there might exist other reasons by which the specialty court judge should consider whether to recuse himself or herself from an ensuing adversarial proceeding based on possible bias. See, e.g., Arkfeld, supra note 9, at 320 (providing the following example of possible bias when the specialty court judge is called to preside at a later sentencing hearing: “The judge who had worked with the defendant throughout the failed treatment process might no longer be in the position to be considered objective and open-minded.”).